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NOTES AND COMMENTS
A REEXAMINATION OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A JURY
TRIAL UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
I. INTRODUCTION
The seventh amendment1 guarantee of a jury trial extends to civil
causes of action created by Congress when the new rights are somewhat
analogous to an 18th century right and when the statutory remedy is
legal in nature.2 This simple statement, however, belies the actual diffi-
culty of the inquiry, particularly because questions of legislative intent
are added to an already demanding analysis. An apt example is employ-
ment discrimination actions requesting back pay under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).3 Despite dissatisfaction among
commentators4 and some judges,5 the foregone conclusion has circulated
among the federal courts that Title VII affords no right to a jury trial.
Little analysis has accompanied this conclusion, with some courts simply
citing decisions in other circuits without comment.' Of the courts that
have addressed the issue, few have found a historical analogue from
1. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIL
2. See, eg., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974); F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCE-
DURE § 8.1, at 410-11 (3d ed. 1985).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1-17 (1988). Title VII proscribes discrimination in employment. Specifi-
cally, an employer may not "fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise discrimi-
nate with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment on the basis of
race, sex, religion, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
4. Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of Rational
Decision Making, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 486, 526-31 (1975); Comment, Jury Trial Right Under Title
VII: The Need for Judicial Reinterpretation, 6 CARDOZO L. REv. 613 (1985).
5. Ochoa v. American Oil Co., 338 F. Supp. 914 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Beesley v. Hartford Fire
Ins. Co., 717 F. Supp. 781 (N.D. Ala. 1989), rehg granted, 723 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Ala. 1989).
6. Among the first courts to decide the issue were Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791
(4th Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,
417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969). Later decisions included Harmon v. May Broadcasting Co., 583 F.2d
410 (8th Cir. 1978); Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975); and EEOC v. Detroit Edison
Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975).
7. See, ag., Harmon v. May Broadcasting Co., 583 F.2d 410 (8th Cir. 1978).
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which to "preserve" the right to jury trial.' Others have construed Title
Vii's back pay award as an equitable remedy through a variety of ratio-
nales: (1) Title VII back pay is a form of equitable restitution rather than
legal damages,9 (2) the discretionary nature of Title VII back pay makes
it equitable,"0 and (3) Title VII back pay is an "integral part of an equita-
ble remedial scheme."11
Even though courts have reached a consensus in their conclusion,
two recent Supreme Court decisions have provoked a renewed debate of
the jury trial issue. Prior to Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,12 an em-
ployee subjected to racial harassment in the workplace could allege viola-
tions of both Section 198113 and Title VII in a complaint.14 By linking
8. Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 296 F. Supp. 1232, 1241 (N.D. G . 1968), rev'd on other
grounds, 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970). Other courts have simply not discussed a historical analogue
presumably for the same reason. But see Ochoa v. American Oil Co., 338 F. Supp. 914 (S.D. Tex.
1972). In Ochoa, the court found that a Title VII action was analogous to an action for breach of
contract for wrongful discharge. After concluding that a right to jury trial existed, the court never-
theless held that a jury trial was not available because of the prior binding force of Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969). For a discussion of possible histori-
cal analogues, see infra notes 115-46 and accompanying text.
9. EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp.,
444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S.
189, 197 (1974). See also infra notes 180-193 and accompanying text.
10. Discussing the discretionary nature of Title VII back pay, Justice Rehnquist stated:
[t]o the extent, then, that the District Court retains substantial discretion as to whether or
not to award backpay notwithstanding a finding of unlawful discrimination, the nature of
the jurisdiction which the court exercises is equitable, and under our cases neither party
may demand a jury trial.
Ablemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 443 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). See Slack v.
Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 1975); Culpepper v. Reynolds Metal Co., 296 F. Supp. 1232,
1241 (N.D. Ga. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970). See also infra notes 160-
79 and accompanying text.
11. This phrase originated in Smith v. Hampton Training School for Nurses, 360 F.2d 577, 581
n.8 (4th Cir. 1966) (Section 1981 and 1983 action), and was eventually adopted with little or no
discussion of its meaning in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th
Cir. 1969), and Harmon v. May Broadcasting Co., 583 F.2d 410, 410-11 (8th Cir. 1978). See also
infra notes 180-93 and accompanying text.
12. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
13. Section 1981 states in part:
[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every
State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to
the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and prop-
erty as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penal-
ties, taxes, licenses, and exactations of every kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988) (emphasis added).
14. Beesley v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 717 F. Supp. 781, 782 (N.D. Ala. 1989), reh'g granted,
723 F. Supp. 635 (N.D. Ala. 1989). In Beesley, the court stated:
[i]n recent years many a Southern black plaintiff claiming to be the victim of an act of race
discrimination by his private employer has simultaneously invoked 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and
Title VII. The obvious reason for traveling the dual path toward judicially mandated equal
treatment has been to obtain a jury trial instead of a bench trial.
2
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these causes of action, the plaintiff obtained a jury trial because Section
1981 generally provides a right to jury trial. 5 According to Patterson,
however, Section 1981 is limited to racial harassment arising literally
from the making or enforcement of an employment contract. 16 As a re-
suit, a large class of employment discrimination victims can no longer
join a Section 1981 action with a Title VII action in order to obtain a jury
trial. Without the use of this tactic, Title VII plaintiffs have begun to
raise the right to jury trial issue again. 7 Shortly after Patterson, the
Court further stimulated the debate in Teamsters, Local No. 391 v.
Terry I8 by classifying back pay under the Labor Management Relations
Act 19 as legal, constitutionally guaranteeing a jury trial.20
Upon closer inquiry, the issue of a jury trial under Title VII is not as
clear as the consensus among the federal courts implies. Although the
language and legislative history of Title VII do not provide a clear an-
swer, the jury trial issue should not rest on the statute itself because the
seventh amendment was intended to create a right that could not be ab-
rogated by Congress. Under a seventh amendment analysis, a right to
jury trial is guaranteed because Title VII actions are similar to several
common law contract and tort actions and because Title VII back pay
serves the same purpose as traditional contract damages.
II. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
Before determining whether a constitutional right to a jury trial ex-
ists under the seventh amendment, the wording of the statute, its legisla-
tive history, and the policies that guided the statute's passage must be
analyzed to determine if the constitutional issue can be avoided.2'
Id.
15. Back pay was deemed a legal remedy, and thus a right to jury trial existed in Santiago-
Negron v. Castro-Davila, 865 F.2d 431 (1st Cir. 1989); Thomas v. Resort Health Related Facility,
539 F. Supp. 630 (D.C.N.Y. 1982); Setser v. Novack Inv. Co., 483 F. Supp. 1147 (E.D. Mo. 1980),
rev'd, 638 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated in part, 657 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. 1981), cerL denied, 454
U.S. 1064 (1981). But see Williams v. Owensborough-Illinois, Inc. 665 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1982),
cerL denied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982); Moore v. Sun Oil Co., 636 F.2d 154 (6th Cir. 1980).
16. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2372-73.
17. See, eg., Walton v. Cowin Equip. Co., 733 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ala. 1990); Beesley v. Hart-
ford Fire Ins. Co., 717 F. Supp. 781 (N.D. Ala. 1989), reh'g granted, 723 F. Supp. 635 (D. Ala.
1990).
18. 110 S. Ct. 1339 (1990). In addition, in March of 1990, the Court reiterated that it "has not
ruled on the question whether a plaintiff seeking relief under Title VII has a right to jury trial."
Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 110 S. Ct. 1331, 1335 n.1 (1990).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988).
20. In doing so, the Court expressly distinguished back pay under Title VII, leaving that ques-
tion unanswered. 110 S. Ct. 1339, 1346 (1990).
21. The Supreme Court has long followed the "'cardinal principle that this Court will first
1991]
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A. Statutory Construction
Absent an explicit reference to trial procedure, the search for legisla-
tive intent through statutory construction must rely upon Title VII's am-
biguous enforcement provision. Under the enforcement provision, if the
court finds an unlawful employment practice, the court may grant relief
by reinstating the plaintiff or by giving back pay.22 Arguably, the use of
the word court signifies that Congress intended for judges to try Title VII
actions without a jury.23 While it is true that the word court may be
interchanged with the word judge in certain instances,24 it is frequently
used in statutes, including those dealing with antidiscrimination, in ways
that cannot be construed to mean the judge alone.25 In addition, when
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional] ques-
tion may be avoided.'" Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577 (1978) (quoting United States v. Thirty-
seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971)).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988). The full text provides that:
[i]f the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally en-
gaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin
the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such af-
firmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstate-
ment or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by the employer,
employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the unlawful
employment practice), or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. Back
pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge
with the Commission. Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by
the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise
allowable. No order of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement of an individ-
ual as a member of a union, or the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as
an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was refused admis-
sion, suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment or advancement or was suspended
or discharged for any reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin or in violation of section 2000e-3(a) of this title.
Id.
23. See Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 296 F. Supp. 1232, 1239 (N.D. Ga. 1969), rev'd on
other grounds, 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970).
24. For example, one legal definition of "court" in BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 352-53 (6th ed.
1990) states that "[t]he words 'court' and 'judge,' or 'judges,' are frequently used in statutes as
synonymous." Id. at 353.
25. Title VII itself uses the word "court" in different senses within the enforcement provisions.
In one provision, jurisdiction is conferred upon "district courts," obviously referring to the "institu-
tion" rather than the "judge." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(O(3) (1988). Another provision, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f(l) (1988), refers to the power of the "court" to stay proceedings, obviously referring to
the "judge". In other sections of Title VII, the word "judge" is explicitly used. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(0(4)-(5) (1988). If Congress intended civil actions to be tried by a judge alone, it follows that the
drafters would have specifically referred to a "judge" in subsection (g) also. In Olearchick v. Ameri-
can Steel Foundries, 73 F. Supp. 273, 280 (W.D. Pa. 1947), a district court interpreted section 216 of
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), which stated that "the court.., shall...
allow a reasonable attorney's fees" to "include[ ] and mean[ ] the court and jury, if the case is tried
before a jury." In Rucker v. Wabash R.R., 418 F.2d 146 (7th Cir. 1969), the word "court" in a
state statute was defined to include jurors. In doing so, the court stated that "[tihe term 'court' need
not always be construed as referring to the judge in the performance of his duties. It also has an
institutional meaning and may sometimes refer to the deliberative body of jurors." Id. at 152.
4
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the right to jury trial is at issue, the Supreme Court has afforded little
significance to the use of court in statutory schemes.26 For example, in
Curtis v. Loether,2 the plaintiff attempted to persuade the Court that
jury trials could not be granted under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act
of 196828 because it contained language similar to that of Title VII, and
particularly because the word court was used.29 Although the trial court
explicitly agreed with the plaintiff's arguments,30 the Court rejected this
conclusion by ignoring the statutory language issue altogether.31
B. Legislative History
As with the language of the statute, the turbulent passage32 of Title
VII furnishes sparse and somewhat illusory legislative history on the is-
sue of jury trials. The bill 33 containing Title VII moved through the
House of Representatives with only cursory examination of particular
"Court" has been considered to have a meaning other than judge-only in other contexts as well. For
example, a constitutional "court" includes the jury. State ex rel Harp v. Vanderburg Circuit Court,
85 N.E.2d 254, 257 (1949); McDonald v. Swope, 79 F. Supp. 30, 35 (7th Cir. 1948); In re Caruba, 51
A.2d 446, 458 (N.J. Ch. 1947); Peisker v. Chavez, 123 P.2d 726, 728-729 (1942).
26. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
27. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1988).
29. Brief for Petitioner at 9-14, Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) (No. 72-1035). Section
3612(c) provides in part:
The court may grant as relief, as it deems appropriate, any permanent or temporary injunc-
tion, temporary restraining order, or other order, and may award to the plaintiff actual
damages and not more than $1,000 punitive damages, together with court costs and rea-
sonable attorneys fees in the case of a prevailing plaintiff.
42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1981), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c) (1988).
30. Rogers v. Loether, 312 F. Supp. 1008, 1010 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
31. 415 U.S. at 191-92. See also Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982). Section
2201 provides that "any court of the United States ... may declare the rights and other legal
relations of any interested party .... " Despite the use of "court," the Supreme Court has focused
on the nature of the underlying claim, not the provision for "courts" awarding relief. Beacon Thea-
ters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
32. The attempted filibuster in the Senate reveals the passionate setting of the bill's passage.
For instance:
Not only did the bill's supporters present the affirmative case; they also harassed the filibus-
tering opponents by interrupting their speeches in an almost unprecedented fashion. A
good illustration is contained in the close Humphrey questioning of Senator Allen Ellender
[Dem., La.], in which the latter actually was led to concede that some southern Negroes
were kept from voting because of their race.
2 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS 1090 (B. Schwartz, ed. 1970) [here-
inafter STATUTORY HISTORY]. See generally C. WHALEN & B. WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE:
A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS AcT (1985).
33. H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
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provisions34 and with no discussion of jury trial procedure. In compari-
son, the amount of Floor Debate in the Senate increased significantly,3"
but the issue of jury trials in the context of Title VII's civil action still did
not receive dispositive attention. In two brief exchanges during an at-
tempted filibuster, opponents of the bill mentioned the jury trial proce-
dure for civil actions; but the theatrical exchanges add little insight to
congressional intent.3 6 Perhaps the clearest indication of intent came
when the Senate Floor Managers of the bill developed and inserted into
the Congressional Record a memorandum overviewing the basic provi-
sions of Title VII.37 When addressing the trial procedure for civil ac-
tions, the memorandum stated that suits "would ordinarily be heard by
34. Under a House rule, debate over the entire Act was limited to ten hours, with final action to
take place within twelve days. See 2 STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 32, at 1089. Only the House
Committee on the Judiciary gave a report on H.R. 7152. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1963). One congressman summed up the committee proceedings by complaining that the bill was
"rammed through the Judiciary Committee in a star chamber proceeding without debate, without an
opportunity to offer amendments and with only a 2-minute discussion, 1 minute for Chairman Cellar
and 1 minute for his counterpart ...." 2 STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 32, at 1098 (Sen. W.
Colmer, D., Miss.) Another member reported that "[t]he Jldiciary Committee or its subcommittees
held no hearings on the language of title VII" and that "Committee members bad no part in produc-
ing the phraseology title VII contains." H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 57 (1963) (Addi-
tional views of Hon. George Meador). See also H.R. REP. No. 570, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., (1963).
35. The Senate debate lasted for 534 hours, 1 minute and 37 seconds. EEOC, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF TrLEs VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1964 at 11.
36. The first instance was a colloquy between Senators Talmadge and Sparkman in connection
with the power of the Attorney General under Title VII to bring suit before a three-member judicial
panel:
Mr. Talmadge. In other words, all the provisions of this bill would subject every
American citizen to the whims and caprices of the Attorney General, and lead to govern-
ment by injunction; is that not correct?
Mr. Sparkman. The Senator is correct-without trial by jury.
Mr. Talmage. Without trial by jury.
Mr. Sparkman. Without trial by jury.
2 STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 32, at 1066. The Senators continued the discussion by ironically
comparing the power of the Attorney General under the Act with the powers used by Hitler and
Mussolini in the 1930's. Id. at 1167-68. Even if the theatrical nature of this exchange is discarded,
the Senators were clearly referring only to suits brought by the Attorney General and not suits
brought by the victims of discrimination.
The right to jury trial issue appeared once again during a question and answer session with one
of the Senate sponsors. During the session, the outspoken opponent to the bill, Sen. Ervin from
North Carolina, asked about the right to a jury trial under the Constitution, pointing out that the
award of back pay would often exceed the $20 amount in the seventh amendment. The Senate
sponsor, Sen. Case, responded that "[s]o far as the act itself is concerned, there is no provision for
jury trial. Of course, whether ajury trial would be required would depend upon the Supreme Court
...." 110 CONG. REc. 7255 (1964). The remark is of little value because it soon becomes evident
that Sen. Case was confusing the right to a jury trial in the civil action with the much-debated issue
of a jury trial under criminal contempt provisions. See id. at 7253-57.
37. On April 8, 1964, Senators Clark (D., Pa.) and Case (R., N.J.) introduced the memoran-
dum on Title VII of the House-approved H.R. 7152. 110 CONG. REc. 7212-15 (1964), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI, supra note 35, at 3039-45.
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the judge sitting without a jury in accordance with the customary prac-
tice for suits for injunctive relief.""8 This lone statement, however, does
not represent what Congress as a whole desired regarding jury trials in
actions requesting back pay awards. Rather, it could reasonably imply
either that those who developed the memorandum incorrectly viewed the
monetary back pay award as injunctive relief, or that they unrealistically
believed that ordinarily only injunctive relief, as opposed to back pay,
would be sought.
The jury trial issue was not raised again until 1972 when congres-
sional leaders sought ways to solidify Title VII. As part of a largely
political3 9 and strategic move, opponents of Title VII offered a series of
amendments of their own that restricted, rather than solidified, enforce-
ment.' One by one the opponents' amendments were voted down, in-
cluding a proposal for jury trials. When the jury trial amendment came
to the floor, congressional leaders supplied two shrift and vague reasons
to vote against it: (1) granting a jury trial in Title VII actions would be
unique in the "antidiscrimination field," an idea grounded on the fear of
juror bias,41 and (2) a jury trial may unnecessarily prolong the amount of
time for a plaintiff to receive relief.42 These policy reasons, however, no
longer remain persuasive.
C. The Policies Behind Denying a Jury Trial
Little evidence exists of any explicit reason or policy behind the jury
trial omission.43 To fill the void, several commentators have suggested
38. Id. at 7214, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI, supra note 35, at 3044 (empha-
sis added).
39. The political nature of the amendment can be seen in a speech made by the sponsor of the
amendment proposal who urged that a jury trial should be provided regardless of the seventh
amendment's division between legal and equitable proceedings. S. 908, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., 118
CONG. REc. 4919-20 (1972) (Ervin, D., N.C., sponsor).
40. Id. In addition to the jury trial provision, some of the amendments included a proposal to
eliminate educational institutions from the scope of Title VII and inserting a clause that would not
allow preferential treatment under affirmative action plans. 118 CONG. REc. 4915-20 (1964).
41. S. 908, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. REc. 4920 (1972). See infra notes 45-65 and accom-
panying text.
42. S. 908, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. REc. 4919-20 (1972). See infra notes 66-77 and
accompanying text.
43. Some members of Congress expressed concerned about possible bias as the enforcement
provision of Title VII was developed. When H.R 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), surfaced, a
controversy arose as to the enforcement provision, which provided for cease and desist orders to be
issued by a central board. When voicing their objection to a board enforced provision, the members
stated that "It]he historic safeguard of a trial before an impartial judiciary would be abandoned" if
the cease and desist procedure was adopted. Eventually, a compromise was reached where enforce-
ment would come through actions in federal courts. It is unclear whether the members were con-
cerned about the impartiality of an executive appointed board or whether the members were
1991]
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that juror bias would undermine the enforcement of Title VII, particu-
larly in the South.' A second reason occasionally mentioned is that a
jury trial could delay the possibility of relief for the discrimination
victim.
1. Juror Bias
Support for the juror bias theory may be gathered by examining the
structural mechanisms inserted by Congress to create effective and non-
biased enforcement of Title VII. Spurred by volatile historical forces of
the early 1960's,45 Congress introduced stronger civil rights bills, includ-
ing nationwide fair employment legislation in the form of Title VII.46
Increasingly aware that Title VII would not be effective in a justice sys-
tem in which Blacks played no part,47 Congress sought mechanisms to
concerned about juror bias. H.R. REP. No. 570, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1963) (Additional Views
of Reps. Frelinghuysen and Griffin) (emphasis added).
The more well-known policy reason, that ofjuror bias, may stem from the fact that almost all of
the statutes in the antidiscrimination field originally did not contain jury provisions. Since the time
of their original enactment, however, the Supreme Court has found that several anti-discrimination
statutes possess a constitutional jury trial right. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) (holding
that Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 contains a constitutional right to a jury trial); Loril-
lard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978) (holding that the legislative history of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act supports the right to jury trial).
44. C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION § 9.9, at 578 (Ist ed. 1980); Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824, 878 (1972); Comment,
The Seventh Amendment and Civil Rights Statutes: History Adrift in a Maelstrom, 68 Nw. U.L.
REV. 503, 537-40 (1973); Note, The Right to Jury Trial Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 37 U. CI. L. REv. 167 (1969). See also Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34 (5th Cir.
1966); Lawton v. Nightingale, 345 F. Supp 683, 684 (N.D. Ohio 1972) (Section 1983 action; "[t]he
person seeking to vindicate an unpopular right could never succeed before a jury drawn from a
populace mainly opposed to his views.").
Another reason occasionally given is that the issues in a class action suit may be too complex forjurors. Beesley v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 717 F. Supp. 781 (N.D. Ala. 1989), reh 'g ranted, 723 F.
Supp. 635, 650-52 (N.D. Ala. 1989).
45. A concise background of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 can be found in 2 STATUTORY His-
TORY OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 32, at 1017-20. In it, Prof. Schwartz attributes the pas-
sage of the Act to the civil rights activity in Birmingham, the death of President Kennedy, and the
political conversion of President Johnson in his support of civil rights. Id.
46. Id. at 1018.
47. The Civil Rights Commission of 1961 found that minorities had never sat on a jury in some
jurisdictions. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT: JUSTICE 89-104 (1961). The Commission
recommended new federal legislation after noting that minority exclusion persisted despite repeated
decisions by the Supreme Court, beginning with Strauder v. W. Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (hold-
ing that race-based exclusions from jury service violated the fourteenth amendment equal protection
clause). Id. See also F. READ & L. MCGOUGH LET THEM BE JUDGED: THE JUDICIAL INTEGRA-
TION OF THE DEEP SOUTH 322-52 (1978). For an exposition of jury selection abuses, see Hearings
on S. 3296 Before the Subcomm. on Const. Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 256 (1966).
8
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 26 [1990], Iss. 4, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol26/iss4/5
RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
provide effective enforcement without relying on the discretion of a sys-
tem historically entrenched against civil rights. This search resulted in
the creation of an independent Commission which would handle the pre-
liminary employment discrimination complaints. 8 Other, more subtle
attempts surfaced in the form of exclusive federal court jurisdiction49 and
the widespread use of injunctive relief throughout the Act.50 The pursuit
of adequate enforcement, however, necessarily precluded giving much at-
tention 51 to the mandates of the seventh amendment since a biased jury
could potentially undercut the effectiveness of Title VII.
Yet, the juror bias thought to undermine the enforcement of Title
VII has been eliminated to some extent by the use of procedural devices.
First, Congress enacted the Federal Jury Selection and Services Act of
196852 to provide an alternative to voter registration rolls when impanel-
ing jurors. Because voter rolls are thought to be unrepresentative of the
community,53 the Act provides that federal courts "shall prescribe some
other source ...where necessary to foster the policy of [community
cross-section representation]. 54 Stricter restrictions on exemptions from
federal jury service for "undue hardship," as well as better compensation
further guarantees representative impanelment.55 At the voir dire
phase,56 a trend has emerged to require an explicit, non-racial reason for
using peremptory challenges on prospective jurors who are minorities.57
48. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4 & 5 (1988).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(t(3) (1988).
50. See, ag., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988). This section gives the court power to grant preventive
relief, permanent or temporary injunctions, and restraining orders. See also H.R. REP. No. 914,
88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 46-50 (1964) (complaints by one member of the Judiciary Committee
that the Act creates government by injunction).
51. See, eg., 110 CONG. REc. 7253-57 (1964) (confusion over the nature of the right to jury in
civil actions, as opposed to criminal actions). The lack of attention may result, in part, from the
erroneous belief that a uniquely modem statutory scheme such as the civil rights act would not fall
under the dictates of the seventh amendment. The Supreme Court in Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189
(1974), however, made it clear that the constitutional right extended to civil rights statutes.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1861-1878 (1988). But see Kairys, Kadane, & Lehoczky, Jury Representative-
ness A Mandate for Multiple Source Lists, 65 CAL. L. REv. 776, 778 (1977) ("at present, only two
federal district courts... use multiple lists").
53. See J. GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 49 (1988).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (1988). Critics charge that the Act has been applied requiring an
incorrect standard, thus making it virtually ineffective. See, eg., Jury Representativeness: A Man-
date for Multiple Source Lists, supra note 52.
55. Jury System Improvement Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. § 1869 (Supp. 1980).
56. Another curb on jury bias is the discretion of the judge to conduct voir dire, rather than
counsel. FED. R. Civ. P. 47(a). See Hicks v. Mickelson, 835 F.2d 721, 725-26 (8th Cir. 1988).
57. The trend began in the criminal setting with the Supreme Court decision in Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Since then, two circuits extended the holding of Batson to civil actions.
See Dunham v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 919 F.2d 1201 (7th Cir. 1990); Fludd v. Dykes, 863
F.2d 822 (11th Cir. 1989). The fifth circuit initially adopted the Batson standard, but after a hearing
en banc, overruled itself. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 860 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1988), rev'd,
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Finally, at the trial stage, the Supreme Court58 has recognized that juror
bias does not control the jury trial issue because the judge can undermine
prejudice of juries by directing a verdict,59 granting summary judg-
ment,' or by ordering a new trial.61 Additionally, the trial judge has the
power to grant special verdicts62 and can control abuse through jury
instructions.63
Perhaps the most persuasive practical evidence for the proposition
that juror bias should no longer play a role in the right to jury trial issue
is that employment discrimination plaintiffs themselves do not necessar-
ily perceive the jury as biased. Plaintiffs complaining of discrimination
request juries under Title VII and Section 1981 at least as often as de-
fendants. 64 The inference from a plaintiff's request for a jury is that even
when the jury does not perfectly match the cross-section of the commu-
nity, the decision coming from those jurors may still be fair. A discrimi-
nation victim's desire for a jury may also reflect a realization that jurors
have an equal or weightier bias against the large corporate defendant. 65
If the policy against jury trials in antidiscrimination actions was devel-
oped to protect discrimination victims, yet discrimination victims no
longer perceive the need for protection, the policy should no longer be
given the same credence.
895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, II1 S. Ct. 41 (1990). The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals has also expressed in dicta that Batson may extend to civil actions. Wilson v. Cross, 845
F.2d 163, 165 (8th Cir. 1988). At least one Federal District Court has applied the Batson holding in
a civil action. Clark v. City of Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp. 890 (D. Conn. 1986). In the future, it is
likely that Batson will serve as a "precedential framework" when similar issues arise in the "civil
sphere" in the remaining circuits. J. GUINTHER, supra note 53, at 50.
58. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 198 (1974). In Curtis, the petitioner argued that the right
to jury trial should not be given under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 because evidence
existed that Congress did not provide for jury trials because of the possibility of juror bias. The
Court rejected this contention by listing several procedural safeguards and by emphasizing that the
"clear constitutional principles" overrode the policy considerations. Id.




63. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-74 (1976).
64. The court in Beesley v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 717 F. Supp. 781 (N.D. Ala. 1989), reh'g
granted, 723 F. Supp. 635 (N.D. Ala. 1989), allowed a jury trial in a Title VII action partly based on
the observation that there were "23 cases pending in this very court in which the plaintiff had...
requested a jury trial." Id. at 637 n.l.
In the Section 1981 context, one commentator noted that "[o]ut of 25 cases found in which
there was a motion for jury trial ... the plaintiffs made the motion in fourteen." Developments in the
Law - Section 1981, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 33, 255 & 255 n.227 (1980).
65. Id. at 253.
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2. Expediency
Given the already lengthy administrative process required by Title
VII, foregoing a jury trial would not expedite relief. When creating Title
VII, Congress ignored warnings that the administrative process would
delay relief for the discrimination plaintiff.66 Later, however, Congress
permitted Title VII plaintiffs to choose whether or not to exhaust admin-
istrative procedures before filing a suit, contrary to normal administra-
tive law principles.67 Yet, if the plaintiff wishes, he or she may opt to
wait almost indefinitely before suing an employer.68 Even though the
current version does not provide a definite time within which a plaintiff
must bring suit, "the prospective plaintiff must usually wait a minimum
of 180 days from filing his or her charge with the Commission before
bringing suit."69 For practical purposes then, the relatively short delay
created by a jury trial does not compare to the already arduous adminis-
trative process.7'
In addition, when faced with the issue of jury trials under other an-
tidiscrimination statutes, the Supreme Court has given little deference to
arguments of expediency or delay. In Lorillard v. Pons,71 the Equal Em-
ployment Advisory Council, as an amicus curiae, argued that "Congress
did not wish to add the attendant delays of jury trial to the problems
facing" plaintiffs alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act (ADEA).72 Despite this policy reason, the Court held in-
stead that legislative history supported a jury trial.7 3 The plaintiff in
Curtis v. Loether74 also attempted to persuade the Court that when en-
acting Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 19687 Congress intended to
provide quick relief for plaintiffs, thus precluding a jury trial:
Congress' decision to prohibit juries in Title VIII litigation was in-
tended in part to assure that a final judgment could be rendered as
66. As stated by one member of the Judiciary Committee in a house Report, "this system has
all of the disadvantages of a slow and costly court action in which a person denied employment
because of his race may have to wait as long as 2 years for relief." H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong.,
Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 41. (1963) (Additional Majority Views of Hon. Robert W. Kastenmeier).
67. 2 C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER, & R. RICHARDS, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 11.7.1,
at 470 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION].
68. Id. § 11.7, at 471-72.
69. Id. § 11.7.1, at 471.
70. Id.
71. 434 U.S. 575, 585 (1977).
72. Brief of the Amicus Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Council at 9, Lorillard, 434
U.S. 575 (1977) (No. 76-1346).
73. 434 U.S. 575 (1977).
74. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
75. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1988).
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quickly as possible in these cases. Such a congressional command
must of course be heeded even in a case where, despite the availability
of a non-jury trial, other developments have brought about a delay. 76
While the Court in Curtis acknowledged that jury trials "may delay to
some extent the disposition" of the action, it disregarded delay as "insuf-
ficient to overcome" the jury trial right. 7
III. THE ROLE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT WITHIN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE
If one still concludes that legislative intent prohibits a jury trial
under Title VII, the question becomes what role that intent should play
when confronted with the possibility that the seventh amendment would
require an opposite conclusion. The question becomes particularly acute
under the seventh amendment because it only "preserves" the common
law right to jury trial, leaving open to speculation the weight to be given
legislative intent in new statutory causes of action. Although Supreme
Court decisions do not provide a definitive answer, the proponents of the
seventh amendment intended to guard against any congressional at-
tempts to override the jury trial right.
A. United States Supreme Court Decisions
In Pernell v. Southall Realty,7" the Supreme Court faced the right to
jury question in the context of a District of Columbia statutory scheme
that allowed real property owners to repossess land for nonpayment of
rent."9 Congress had recently repealed the statutory provision which
preserved the right to jury trial;s0 the negative implication of the repeal
was that Congress either struck the provision as unnecessary in light of
the constitutional guarantee or simply wished to do away with jury trials
under the statutory design." Sweeping aside the question of legislative
intent, the court of appeals dealt with the issue solely on constitutional
grounds. 2 On certiorari, the Supreme Court also limited itself to the
76. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 5, Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) (No. 72-1035).
77. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 198.
78. 416 U.S. 363 (1974).
79. Id. at 364.
80. D.C. Code § 13-702 (1969) provided that "[w]hen the amount in controversy in a civil
action ... exceeds $20, and in all actions for the recovery of possession of real property ......
Congress repealed § 13-702 with the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure
Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-358, § 142 (5)(A), 84 Stat. 552 (1970).
81. Pernell, 416 U.S. at 365-66.
82. Pernell v. Southall Realty, 294 A.2d 490 (D.C. 1972). The court stated that "irrespective of
intent it is clear that, if the seventh amendment itself guarantees a right to demand a jury in a
[Vol. 26:571
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purely constitutional analysis, sidestepping a direct confrontation with
the arguably contrary legislative intent by acquiescing to the appeal
court's analysis. 3
Later, the Court again tacitly confronted the issue of intent in Curtis
v. Loether.84 In Curtis, the plaintiff brought an action under Title VIII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1968,85 claiming that the defendants refused to
rent an apartment to the plaintiff because of her race.8 6 At the trial, the
defendants requested and were denied a jury trial. Although Title VIII
did not express whether jury trials were available, 8 the weight of legisla-
tive history indicated that Congress intended for Title VIII actions to be
tried by judges.8 9 Rejecting the proffered policy reasons behind the pro-
posed legislative intent,9° the Court, despite its own admonition to search
the legislative history first,91 limited itself to the "clear" constitutional
principles. 92
Read broadly, Pernell and Curtis suggest that the constitutional
guarantee of a trial by jury overwhelms any contrary congressional de-
sign. Unfortunately, neither opinion adequately tested the proposition
because neither squarely faced a situation where Congress strongly op-
posed a jury trial. Moreover, because the Court has chosen to consider
the "practical abilities and limitations of the juries"93 in their constitu-
tional analysis, any conclusions drawn from the implications of these
cases need to be balanced against the role of the legislature in defining
statutory proceeding for summary possession, the trial court erred in denying this right." Id. at 491
(emphasis added).
83. Pernell, 416 U.S. at 366.
84. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
85. Civil Rights Act of 1968, tit. viii, § 801, 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1988).
86. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 190.
87. Id. at 190-91.
88. At the time of this suit, 42 U.S.C § 3612(c) provided only that "[t]he court may grant as
relief, as it deems appropriate, any permanent or temporary injunction, temporary restraining order,
or other order, and may award to the plaintiff actual damages and not more than $1,000 punitive
damages .... " 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1968). Since then, Congress has amended the civil action
enforcement provisions to simply provide for "actual and punitive" damages. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(1)
(1988).
89. Compare Brief for Petitioner at 15-19, Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) (No. 72-1035)
with Brief for Respondents at 8-9, Curtis (No. 72-1035). After labelling both arguments as "plausi-
ble," the Court chose to focus on the constitutional issues. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 192.
90. The Court stated that "[there seems to be some indication that supporters of Title VIII
were concerned that the possibility of racial prejudice on juries might reduce the effectiveness of civil
rights damages actions." Curtis, 415 U.S. at 191-92 & n.4.
91. Id. at 192 n.6.
92. Id. at 192.
93. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970). See Note, Ross v. Bernard: The Uncer-
tain Future of the Seventh Amendment, 81 YALE L.J. 112 (1971). Cf. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S.
412, 418 n.4 (1987) (policy will not provide an independent basis for the right to jury trial).
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these policy concerns. Thus, the role of legislative intent in a seventh
amendment analysis must be determined by referring to the intent of the
proponents of the bill of rights.
B. Intent of the Proponents of the Seventh Amendment
While a tentative attitude to override a legislative preference may be
gleaned from past Supreme Court decisions, the debates during the ratifi-
cation of the Constitution show that proponents created the seventh
amendment, in part, to take away from Congress the power to prohibit
juries in civil actions.
At the end of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, the debate
over the right to jury trials in civil actions flared when a jury trial guar-
antee remained omitted from the body of the Constitution.94 With the
omission of the jury trial right as a focal point, the Antifederalists began
to rally the people against ratification of the Constitution.95 One of the
reasons behind the Antifederalists' ardent position was fear that Con-
gress would intentionally ignore jury trials in civil actions.96 The Feder-
alists countered that, among other reasons,9 7 an amendment to the
94. The issue first appeared on September 12, 1787, five days before adjournment of the conven-
tion, in a meeting of the Committee on Style and Arrangement. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FED-
ERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 587-88 (M. Farrand ed. 1937). See also Wolfram, The
Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REv. 639, 656-659 (1973).
95. I. BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTs 39 (1965); J. MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS: CRIIs OF
THE CONSTrTUON 1781-1788, at 158, 255 (1961). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 558 (J.
Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
96. Wolfram, supra note 94, at 656-59.
97. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 94, at 587-88. Other
articulated reasons included the difficulty in distinguishing between courts of law and courts of eq-
uity and an erroneous assumption that the state constitutions could override the U.S. Congress. Id
James Madison recorded the following exchange:
Mr. Williamson, observed to the House that no provision was yet made for juries in
Civil cases and suggested the necessity of it.
Mr. Gorham. It is not possible to discriminate equity cases from those in which juries
are proper. The Representatives of the people may be safely trusted in this matter.
Mr. Gerry urged the necessity of Juries to guard agst. corrupt Judges. He proposed
that the Committee last appointed should be directed to provide a clause for securing the
trial by Juries.
Col: Mason perceived the difficulty mentioned by Mr. Gorham. They jury cases can-
not be specified. A general principle laid down on this and some other points would be
sufficient. He wished the plan had been prefaced with a Bill of Rights, & would second a
Motion if made for that purpose - It would give great quiet to the people; and with the aid
of the State declarations, a bill might be prepared in a few hours.
Mr. Gerry concurred in the idea & moved for a Committee to prepare a Bill of Rights.
Col: Mason 2ded the motion.
Mr. Sherman. was for securing the rights of the people where requisite. The State
Declarations of Rights are not repealed by this Constitution; and being in force are suffi-
cient - There are many cases where juries are proper which cannot be discriminated. The
Legislature may be safely trusted.
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Constitution was unnecessary because the newly-created Congress would
immediately enact such a provision.9"
Rather than leave what was considered a fundamental right99 to the
whims of the federal legislature, the Antifederalists warned citizens that
Congress could not be trusted with upholding such an important right.
For example, James Monroe characterized the Antifederalists' position
in a speech to the Virginia ratification convention.'"0 In the speech,
Monroe offered a hypothetical where Congress enacts a law of taxation
but decides not to provide for a jury trial under the law:
[S]uppose [Congress] should be of opinion that the right to trial by jury
was not one of the requisites to carry it into effect; there is no check in
this Constitution to prevent the formal abolition of it .... They are
not restrained or controlled from making any law, however oppressive
in its operation, which they may think necessary to carry their powers
into effect. By this general, unqualified power, they may infringe not
only on the trial by jury, but the liberty of the press .... Our great
unalienable rights ought to be secured from being destroyed by such
unlimited powers, either by a bill of rights, or by an express provision
in the body of the Constitution.101
As suggested by Monroe's speech, the eventual adoption of the seventh
amendment preempted congressional overrides of the right to a jury trial
by giving the right unyielding constitutional status. Since the seventh
amendment was created to embody a right Congress could not overcome,
little deference should be given to the contrary wishes of Congress. Ac-
cordingly, the right to a jury trial in Title VII actions must stand or fall
on a full constitutional analysis.
V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
The first clause of the seventh amendment provides that "in suits at
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right to jury trial shall be preserved inviolate...." 1o2 Read literally,
The Committee proceeded to vote down the motion for the jury right provision. Id. See also Wolf-
ram, supra note 94, at 659-60.
98. See, eg., 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 561 (J. Elliot ed. 1836 3d ed.) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES]; THE
FEDERALIST No. 83, supra note 95, at 559-60.
99. Patrick Henry described the jury trial as "the best appendage of freedom," and "that inval-
uable blessing." 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 98, at 324, 583. Another sobriquet was "that
inestimable privilege (the most important which freemen can enjoy,) the trial by jury in all civil
cases, has not been guarded by the system." Id. at 610-11.
100. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 98, at 218.
101. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 98, at 218.
102. U.S. CONT. amend. VII.
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the language only preserves the jury trial right as it existed when the sev-
enth amendment was adopted. Accordingly, the right remains static;
neither expanding, nor contracting."0 3 In application, however, the right
to a jury trial has never been limited to only those actions existing in
1791. Rather, the Supreme Court has expanded the seventh amendment
analysis beyond the boundaries of the amendment's language so as to
give utmost protection to the constitutional right.
The erratic division between equity and law, as well as the constant
development of the common law, soon exposed the inherent difficulties of
a strictly literal reading of the seventh amendment. While the wording of
the seventh amendment presumes that common law jurisdiction was well
settled in 1791, in fact, the power of common law and that of equity were
very fluid, resulting in a constant borrowing between the two jurisdic-
tions."°4 In addition to the absence of set boundaries, new causes of ac-
tion continued to evolve as legal principles matured. A tension
consequently developed between the adapting nature of law and the
Court's task of protecting the constitutional guarantee embedded in the
seventh amendment.
In one of the earliest cases involving the seventh amendment, Par-
sons v. Bedford,10 5 the Supreme Court resolved the dilemma by uphold-
ing the constitutional right whenever legal rights are involved. In
particular, the Court stated that:
The phrase 'common law,' found in this clause, is used in contradis-
tinction to equity, and admiralty, and maritime jurisprudence .... By
common law, [the proponents of the Amendment] meant . . . not
merely suits which the common law recognized among its old and set-
tled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained
and determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable rights
alone were recognized, and equitable remedies alone were administered
.... In a just sense, the amendment then may well be construed to
embrace all suits which are not of equity and admiralty jurisdiction,
103. See, e.g., Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 137 F.2d 62, 65 (3rd Cir.1943). See also C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2301 (1971).
104. James, Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 657-663 (1963). Prof.
James explains:
[Tihe line between law and equity (and therefore between jury and non-jury trial) was
not a fixed and static one. There was a continual process of borrowing by one jurisdiction
from the other; there were less frequent instances of sloughing off of older functions ....
This led to a very large overlap between law and equity.
Id. at 658-59.
105. 28 U.S. (3 Pet) 433 (1830).
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whatever might be the peculiar form which they may assume to settle
legal rights.10 6
With this quote from Parsons, seventh amendment analysis began an
irreversible expansion away from the literal language and the mere form
of the action to instead focus on whether any legal rights were involved.
The focus on legal rights rather than an exact historical analogue
continued with the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Faced with the merger of law and equity in 1938,107 the Supreme Court
reevaluated the right to jury trial analysis in light of modem joinder
rules. 1 8 In Beacon Theaters v. Westover,"° the Court refused to allow an
adjudication of an equitable action prior to the legal action if res judicata
would bar the legal action and thus deny the right to a jury trial. Three
years later in Dairy Queen v. Wood,110 the Court rejected a balancing test
that would weigh the amount of equitable remedies with the amount of
legal remedies. More recently, the Court clarified that the right to jury
trial need not rest on "what has been called an 'abstruse historical' search
for the nearest 18th century analog.""' Rather, the "characteriz[ation
of] the relief sought is 'more important' [in] determining whether the
seventh amendment guarantees a jury trial."I 2 Thus, Title VII must be
analized under two tests. First, under the historical test, a similar 18th-
century action of England must be compared to the modem action under
which the jury right is requested."' Second, the remedy must be classi-
fied as legal or equitable." 4
A. The Historical Test
Initially, the seemingly radical nature of civil rights legislation shied
courts away from thoroughly searching for a historical analogue to Title
106. Id. at 446-47 (as edited in Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974) (emphasis partially
supplied).
107. See FED. R. Civ. P. 38.
108. Beacon Theaters v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 509-10 (1959).
109. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
110. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
111. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 421 (1987) (citing Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538
n.10. (1970)).
112. Id (citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974)).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 417-18.
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VII actions." 5 It was thought that an action attempting to rectify dis-
crimination could not possibly find a parallel in an Anglo-American soci-
ety that, in 1791, was largely structured by levels of status and position.
A strictly literal characterization of Title VII, however, overlooks the
true nature of the rights and interests sought to be protected by the Act
and demonstrates the practical limitations of the historical test." 6 When
the inquiry focuses on the comprehensive purpose behind Title VII, that
of combatting and redressing discrimination, analogies can be drawn to
tort actions seeking to enforce generally-owed legal duties. When the
focus shifts to the particular context in which the injury occurred, that of
the employer-employee relationship, analogous contract actions appear
that protect the employee's interest in implied promises made within that
relationship.
1. Analogies to Tort Actions
Focusing on Title VII's goal of redressing injuries suffered from dis-
crimination,' 1 7 an analogy may be drawn to a number of tort actions,
particularly the developing tort of intentional infliction of mental suffer-
ing.11' In the broadest terms, tort "liability must be based upon conduct
which is socially unreasonable."' "19 In more specific terms, both Title
VII and tort law are concerned with conduct which produces mental
suffering. In tort law, an action for intentional infliction of mental dis-
tress has developed in order to compensate for purely mental injuries.'2
115. See Cheatwood v. South Cent. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 303 F. Supp. 754, 756 (M.D. Ala.
1969).
116. See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
117. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) (the purpose of Title VII is to
redress discrimination).
118. Other possible torts include an action in defamation or a dignitary tort. See Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195-96 n.10 (1974) (citing C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERI-
ALS ON TORTS 961 (2d ed. 1969)). An analogy to a dignitary tort could be based upon cases such as
Wolfe v. Georgia Ry. & Elec. Co., 2 Ga. App. 499, 58 S.E. 899 (1907) (court held no action existed
where a white man was mistaken for a negro by a train conductor); Odom v. East Ave, Corp., 178
Misc. 363, 34 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1942) (court held that an action existed for refusal to serve black
plaintiffs); and Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (cause of action existed for plaintiff alleging
harm by denial to vote in Texas election). In Canada, a tort of discrimination was recognized for a
short period of time before it was ruled that a statute preempted any common law claim. See Note,
The Stillborn Tort of Discrimination: Bhadauria v. Board of Governors of Seneca College of Applied
Arts and Technology, 37 N.R. 455, 124 D.LR. (3d) 193 (S.C C 1981), 14 OTTAWA L. REV. 219
(1982).
119. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 1, at 6 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter KEETON & DOBBS]. Citing Title VII, Keeton &
Dobbs stated that "[m]any kinds of employment discrimination are now statutory torts under civil
rights acts, including discrimination based on race, sex, and age." Id. at § 120, at 1027 n.24.
120. See, e.g., Wilson v. Wilkins, 181 Ark. 137, 25 S.W.2d 428 (1930) (threat of lynching suffi-
ciently outrageous for recovery). Often, the same facts supporting a Title VII claim also support an
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A not-quite perfect classification could categorize injuries resulting from
employment discrimination as a subclass or type of mental suffering de-
serving compensation. The analogy becomes more strained, 121 however,
when the nature of the compensation is considered. The relief granted
for purely mental injuries almost always consists of monetary awards
which attempt to compensate the victim commensurate with the amount
of suffering. Title VII back pay awards, on the other hand, only put the
victim back in the position previously occupied without regard to the
degree of mental suffering involved.122
2. Analogies to a Breach of Employment Contract
In England, the paternalistic feudal relationship between lord and
tenant provided the foundation for the legal concept of the employer-
employee relationship in the 18th century.'23 This conception allowed
reciprocal rights and duties to be imposed on the employer and employee
which were designed to protect their relationship. 24 These duties were
originally codified in the Ordinance of Labourers 25 which provided that
action for intentional infliction of mental distress. See, e.g., Luna v. City & County of Denver, 537
F. Supp. 798 (D. Colo. 1982); B. SCHLEi & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW:
FIVE YEAR CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT 301 (2d ed. 1989).
121. The analogy required under a seventh amendment analysis may already be strained to some
extent since none of the tort actions developed until the late 19th century. Intentional infliction of
mental distress did not become actionable "until comparatively recent decades." KEETON & DOBBS,
supra note 119, at § 12, at 55. The flexibility under the modem seventh amendment analysis would
seem to silence any argument based on that contention. See Teamsters, Local No. 314 v. Terry, 110
S. Ct. 1339, 1350 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring) (calling for an elimination of the historical ana-
logue requirement); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195-96 n.10 (1974) (suggesting that intentional
infliction of mental distress is analogous to the injuries suffered from Title VIII discrimination).
122. See Developments in the Law, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109, 1260 (1971); 2 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 67,
at § 14.4.1, at 17.
123. See, e.g., Note, A Common Law Action for the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26 HAsT. L.
REV. 1435, 1438-39 (1975).
124. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 413 (1969 ed.) [hereinaf-
ter BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES]. In 1765, Blackstone stated that:
[t]he contract between them and their masters arises upon the hiring. If the hiring be
general without any particular time limit, the law construes it to be a hiring for a year;
upon a principle of natural equity, that the servant shall serve, and the master maintain
him, throughout all the revolutions of the respective seasons; as when there is work to be
done, as when there is not; but the contract may be made for any larger or smaller term.
The protection of the relationship may have been originally designed to protect the employer
after the Black Plague effectively reduced the pool of workers in the fourteenth century. See 2 W.
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 459-60 (3d ed. 1922). However, some have suggested
that beginning with the sixteenth century, the primary purpose of the laws shifted to focus on the
protection of the employee. See R. MORRIS, GOVERNMENT AND LABOR IN EARLY AMERICA 17-18
(1946).
125. Ordinance of Labourers, 23 Edward III, c. 2 (1349).
1991]
19
Lewis: A Reexamination of the Constitutional Right to a Jury Trial under
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1990
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
employers could not "put away his cause," and that apprentices could be
discharged only for "reasonable cause." 12 6 The English common law
courts continued to protect the relationship by recognizing implied-in-
law obligations prohibiting unjust termination by either party. 127 Unlike
modem implied employment contracts which are generally terminable-
at-will, English law presumed that employment would last for one
year. 121 Upon discharge without cause, the employee could choose
among a curious mix of procedural devices with each giving a distinct
remedy:1 29 (1) an action in assumpsit for quantum meruit,1 30 (2) an ac-
tion in indebitatus assumpsit,1 31 or (3) an action for breach of contract
for wrongful discharge. 132
Unlike a Title VII cause of action, the assumpsit action remedies the
wronged party on the theory of quantum meruit.133 In an action in as-
sumpsit, the employee willingly rescinds the express or implied-in-fact
employment contract and proceeds to sue for the value of services ren-
dered.1 34 The action in assumpsit seems tailored to situations where the
employee works in exchange for wages to be paid at some time in the
future. If the employee is discharged without cause before the wages are
given, an action in assumpsit in quantum meruit would lie. 135 The em-
ployee could then only collect an award on the value of services already
given and would forfeit any right to earnings that would have accrued
126. 1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 124, at 413-14.
127. See Note, supra note 123, at 1438. English courts imposed a presumption that unwritten
contracts for an indefinite period were to last for one year. 1 C. LABATr, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 156 (2d ed. 1913). The employer could discharge the plaintiff
prior to the end of the year only if sufficient cause were shown. Id. § 183. The United States initially
adopted these protective measures but soon substituted them with the doctrine of employment-at-
will. H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272 (1877). Many
consider Wood's treatise to have played a considerable role in the replacement of the one-year pre-
sumption with the modem employment at will theory. See, eg., Note, Implied Contract Rights to
Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335 (1974).
128. H. WOOD, supra note 127, § 134.
129. See H. WOOD, supra note 127, § 125. See also Ochoa v. American Oil Co., 338 F. Supp.
914, 919 (1972) (concluding that a right to jury trial exists under Title VII but bound under appel-
late court precedent). For a concise development of the various common law actions, see D. Douns,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.2 (1973).
130. See infra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
131. See infra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
132. See infra notes 141-46 and accompanying text.
133. See H. WOOD, supra note 127, § 128; RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 4-5 (1937).
134. See, eg., Archard v. Homer, 172 Eng. Rep. 451 (1828) (holding that a servant could not
recover wages due under the whole contract but was limited to the work done during the period
actually served).
135. Employees paid on a quarterly basis would often seek to recover the value of work already
given after being dismissed in the middle of a quarter. H. WOOD, supra note 127, § 128.
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during the remaining time.136 Title VII, on the other hand, gives a
broader remedy to the discharged employee. Back pay includes the
amount of money that would have been earned subsequent to the dis-
charge,' 37 not merely the value of services already rendered.
Although the second action, indebitatus assumpsit, stands closer in
relation to a Title VII action than quantum meruit, the remedy was
founded on the abandoned doctrine of constructive service. Under con-
structive service, an employee did not rescind the contract but rather
stood by ready and willing to work until the end of the employment
term.13 At the end of the employment term, the employee could sue the
employer for any wages not yet paid under the entire contract. The con-
structive service doctrine was unpopular with employees because it re-
quired them to stand by without means to live and without a guarantee
that the wages would be regained in court. Similarly, courts rejected the
doctrine as economically wasteful because the employee had no duty to
obtain new employment.' 39 This action resembles the Title VII back pay
remedy in that it allows the discharged employee the right to obtain relief
under the contract for work that was never done. Title VII, on the other
hand, does not demand that the employee stand by ready and willing to
work.14o
The final possibility, an action for breach of contract by wrongful
discharge, most closely fits a Title VII action 14' and its back pay remedy.
136. H.WOOD, supra note 127, § 128.
137. 2 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 67, at § 14.4.2 (1988). See infra note 163.
138. See Gandell v. Pontigney, 171 Eng. Rep. 119 (1816). There, the plaintiff was improperly
dismissed in the middle of a quarter. The plaintiff remained willing and able to work until the end of
the agreed upon term and then sued the employer for the money owed during that period. See also
Spain v. Arnott, 171 Eng. Rep. 638 (1817) (if the contract is for a one year service, "the year must be
completed, before the servant is entitled to be paid").
139. See Goodman v. Pocock, 15 Q.B. 576 (1850). In America, criticism of economic waste also
caused the demise of the constructive service doctrine. See, eg., Howard v. Daly, 61 N.Y. 362
(1875). In that famous case, a theater engaged a singer to perform during the upcoming season for
ten dollars per week. The singer rehearsed but was never given a part in the production or allowed
to take part in performances. The singer sued for wages under the contract and on appeal the
question arose as to whether the singer had to wait until the end of the season to sue under the
contract for wages. The court rejected the doctrine of constructive service stating that the doctrine
was "at war with principle [and] with the rules of political economy, as it encourages idleness and
gives compensation to men who fold their arms and decline service ... ." Id at 373. See also 5
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1095 (1964).
140. In fact, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988) requires an employee to find interim work: "Interim
earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated
against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable." Id.
141. Several courts have found that an action pursuant to Title VII is analogous to the 18th
century breach of contract by wrongful discharge. See, eg., Ochoa v. American Oil Co., 338 F.
Supp. 914 (1972). See also Cleverly v. Western Electric Co., 69 F.R.D. 348, 351-52 (W.D. Mo.
1975) (an action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act). Title VII plaintiffs frequently
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As noted above, English common law would not let an employer dis-
charge an employee without legal cause. Although a well-defined Eng-
lish class system precluded recognition of discrimination as a wrongful
cause for discharge in the 18th century, Title VII can be understood as a
modem-day legislative decision extending the situations in which a dis-
charge would be considered without legal cause. A further analogy can
be drawn to the remedies available for both actions.142 Under the com-
mon law action, the measure of damages was the wages and benefits due
less any wages and benefits earned since the discharge.143 Undoubtedly
aware of the common law approach, Congress gave wrongfully dis-
charged employees the remedy of "back pay" when creating Title VII. 14
Like the common law remedy,145 the Title VII remedy also specifically
included an "avoidable consequences" clause that subtracted any "in-
terim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence."146
B. Back Pay as a Legal Remedy
The second, and apparently most important,147 stage of the constitu-
tional analysis is classifying the remedy as legal or equitable. On the
surface, the monetary form of Title VII back pay appears to fit squarely
within the confines of the legal category. The Supreme Court, however,
has rejected the presumption that a monetary award necessarily makes a
remedy legal; 148 thus, a more demanding inquiry is required. A thor-
ough inquiry confirms the proposition that Title VII back pay is a legal
rather than an equitable remedy.
allege a breach of contract claim or wrongful discharge claim in addition to their Title VII claim.
Courts often deny the contract claims because of the modem American rule that employment for an
unspecified period of time is employment-at-will which may, with or without cause, be terminated by
the employer at any time. See, e.g., Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 448 F. Supp. 910, 916-17
(E.D. Mich. 1977).
142. See infra notes 149-59 and accompanying text.
143. Emmens v. Elderton, 10 Eng. Rep. 606, 614 (1853) (after dismissal, "the servant or party
employed may recover such damages as a jury may think the loss of the situation has occasioned").
See 11 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1358 (1968); St. Clair v. Local 515, 422 F.2d 128, 132 (6th Cir.
1969).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 20Oe-5(g) (1988).
145. 11 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 143, § 1358; 5 CoRBIN, supra note 139, § 1095.
146. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988).
147. Granfinanciera S.A. v. Nordberg, 109 S. Ct. 2782, 2790 (1989) ("The second stage of this
analysis is more important than the first.").
148. Local 391, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Terry, 110 S. Ct. 1339, 1347 (1990).
The Court stated: "[g]enerally, an action for money damages was 'the traditional form of relief
offered in the courts of law.' This Court has not, however, held that 'any award of monetary relief
must necessarily be "legal" relief.'" Id. (citations omitted).
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1. The Legal Nature of Title VII Back Pay
The distinctly legal nature of back pay is illustrated by the expecta-
tion interest 149 the remedy seeks to protect. As with the traditional ob-
jective behind contract damages,15 0 the purpose behind the Title VII
remedial scheme is to restore persons aggrieved by the consequences of
unlawful employment practices to the position where they would have
been but for the unlawful discrimination.1 5' In contrast to the interests
protected by other remedies, the remedies of Title VII neither require
measurement of the victim's reliance on the implied promise not to dis-
criminate, '52 nor focus on the unjust enrichment by the employer. 53 In-
stead, Title VII seeks to give the employee the value of the expectancy
which the implied promise created,' 54 that of employment uninterrupted
by discrimination. To enforce the employer's implied-in-law promise,
and thus to fulfill the employee's expectancy, Title VII provides both
specific performance of the obligation in the form of reinstatement and
substitutionary relief in the form of back pay. 55
Title VII back pay serves to restore the wronged employee by substi-
tuting a dollar amount in the place of actual wages and other economic
benefits. In a typical Title VII case, an individual plaintiff may request
149. The expectancy interest has been described in this way: "It appears as a 'loss' only by
reference to an unstated ought. Consequently, when the law gauges damages by the value of the
promised performance it is not merely measuring a quantum, but is seeking an end, however vaguely
conceived this end may be." Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages 1, 46
YALE L.J, 52, 53 (1936).
150. R. THOMPSON & J. SEBERT, REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUrrY AND RESTITUTION § 2.02, at
2-11 (1983) ("the objective of contract damages is to place the plaintiff in as good a position as
performance of the contract would have .... ").
151. 118 CONG. REc. 7168 (1972); 118 CONG. REc. 7565 (1972). See also Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) (the purpose of Title VII is to make persons whole for injuries
suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination).
152. Protection of the reliance interest of a promisee on a contract would be measured by deter-
mining any losses the plaintiff has incurred by relying on the performance of the contract. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTAcrs §§ 344(b), 349, 353 (1979). Title VII fails to take into
account any change of position or loss of opportunity by the employee by limiting monetary dam-
ages to the amount of "back pay." Note, supra note 123, at 1259-60.
153. A theory of restitution cannot underlie Title VII remedies. The goal of restitution is to
disgorge a benefit unjustly retained. Employers who discharge or otherwise discriminate against an
employee gain no benefit, leaving nothing to be disgorged. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF REsTi-
TUTION § 1 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1983).
154. The distinctions between expectation, reliance, and restitutionary interests are discussed in
the seminal article, Fuller & Perdue, supra note 149, at 357. The authors state that the expectation
interest is protected by putting "the plaintiff in as good a position as he would have occupied had the
defendant performed his promise." Fuller and Perdue, supra note 149, at 54.
155. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (g) (1973) states that the "court may... order affirmative action as
may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees,
with or without back pay. . . ." Id
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reinstatement at a rate of pay that takes into account any wage increases
occurring during the ensuing litigation. In addition to, or in the alterna-
tive of, reinstatement, the plaintiff would likely request back pay during
the period after the discharge and before the reinstatement, including any
wage increases. 156 Granted, the reinstatement portion of the requested
remedy fits the mold of specific performance of an obligation, and there-
fore would be equitable in nature. 157 The additional claim for back pay,
however, does not become equitable by mere close association with spe-
cific performance. 158 Rather, Title VII back pay is distinct from specific
performance in that it represents not merely the actual back pay or
wages, but it includes the monetary value of all the economic benefits
that would have accrued if the employer had performed its obligations.
Thus, like traditional legal damages, back pay functions as a substitute
for wages the plaintiff would have actually earned.' 59
2. The Statutory Discretion to Give Back Pay
The discretion to give or withhold a remedy is a traditional principle
or characteristic of equity. Citing this principle, some courts have re-
jected the legal nature of Title VII back pay because the wording of Title
VII allows the court to retain discretion over whether or not to award
back pay. However, unlike the broad discretion of equity, the discretion
to withhold Title VII back pay has been limited in practice so that it is
given as a matter of course.
The Supreme Court sharply restricted the discretion to give or with-
hold backpay in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody.)" The statutory lan-
guage seemingly gives great discretion when deciding whether to award
156. 2 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 67, at § 14.4.1. Courts have included in that
amount overtime, raises, or promotions that would have accrued plus many other economic benefits.
See, eg., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974); DiSalvo v. Cham-
ber of Commerce, 568 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1978); and Clairborne v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 583 F.2d 143
(5th Cir. 1978). In some cases the "backpay award is supplemented by an award of 'front pay' to
compensate the victim for the future loss of remuneration that will occur before the victim can attain
her rightful place." 2 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 67, at § 14.4.1.
157. D. DOBBS, supra note 129, § 12.2; A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.4.
158. A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 157, § 12.4.
159. Professor Farnsworth distinguishes specific relief from substitution in this manner:
[r]elief is said to be "specific" when it is intended to give the injured party the very per-
formance that was promised, as when the court orders a defaulting seller of goods to de-
liver them to the buyer. Relief is said to be "substitutional" when it is intended to give the
promisee something in substitution for the promised performance, as when the court
awards a buyer of goods money damages instead of the goods.
A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 157, § 12.2, at 815. See also D. DOBBS, supra note 129, § 3.1.
160. 422 U.S. 405 (1974).
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backpay under Title VII.16 1 The Supreme Court, however, reinterpreted
the level of discretion by noting that the language of Title VII's remedial
scheme was based upon the National Labor Relation Act,162 under
which courts granted back pay as a matter of routine.16 The Court went
on to restrict the amount of discretion by setting the standard of discre-
tion in light of Title VII's "make whole" purpose."6 Thus, "given a
finding of unlawful discrimination, backpay should be denied only for
reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central statu-
tory purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and
making persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimina-
tion."' 65 The effect of Albemarle has been to grant back pay in Title VII
as a matter of course upon a showing of unlawful discrimination.1 66
After Albemarle, the level of discretion to give or withhold Title VII
back pay no longer compares to the level of discretion of traditional eq-
uity. Historically, equity conferred upon the chancellor broad powers of
161. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988) provides, in part, that "the court may enjoin the respondent
from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be
appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or
without backpay." Id
162. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1988). Section 160(c) provides that when the Labor Board has found that
a person has committed an "unfair labor practice," the Board "shall issue" an order "requiring such
person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take affirmative action including
reinstatement of employees with or without back pay .. " See also 110 CONG. REc. 6549 (1964)
(Comments of Sen. Humphrey).
163. The Court stated "[w]e may assume that [when enacting Title VII] Congress was aware
that the [NLRB] Board, since its inception, has awarded backpay as a matter of course - not
randomly ...." Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 419-20. A right to a jury trial does not exist under the
NLRA because its enforcement is wrought through an administrative Board rather than a court.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
164. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 418. In further characterizing the nature of the remedy as compen-
satory. The court stated that Title VII back pay deals with legal injuries of an economic character
and "where legal injury is of an economic character ... the compensation shall be equal to the
injury." Ii (quoting Wicker v. Hoppock, 6 Wall 94, 99 (1867)).
165. Id. at 421.
166. 2 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 67, at 1. See also Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. at 442-43 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (noting that to the extent that back pay is
given as a matter of course the award becomes legal, thereby justifying a jury demand).
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discretion over the remedies available to a wronged party. 167 This discre-
tion was based on notions of "moral law" '168 which eventually developed
into established principles. 69 These established principles, in turn, pro-
vided a framework from which the discretion of chancellors can be cate-
gorized. For instance, the chancellor could deny a remedy to the plaintiff
where the plaintiff seeks redress in bad faith,170 or without "clean
hands," 17 1 or further, where the remedy would produce a hardship upon
the defendant.1 72 In contrast, subsequent to Albemarle, back pay has
been awarded as a matter of course with the only exceptions being where
the plaintiff is guilty of laches, 173 or in some instances, where the defend-
ant can show that either a state protective statute174 or an EEOC advi-
sory letter 175 was relied upon in creating the discriminatory employment
policy. Other typically equitable considerations such as the lack of bad
167. SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 8-9 (26th ed. 1966) [hereinafter SNELL]. During the form-
ative middle ages, equity jurisprudence was a matter of'conscience.' One court described the level of
discretion of Chancellors as:
Equity is a roguish thing: for law we have a measure, know what to trust to; equity is
according to the conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so
is equity. 'Tis all one, as if they should make his foot the standard for the measure we call
a Chancellor's foot; what an uncertain measure would this bel One Chancellor has a long
foot, another a short foot, a third an indifferent foot; 'tis the same thing in the Chancellor's
conscience.
Gee v. Pritchard, 36 Eng. Rep. 670, 679 (1818) (quoting SELDEN, TABLE TALK). See also McElroy
v. Masterson, 156 F. 36, 42 (8th Cir. 1907); Chicago*Auditorium Ass'n v. Willing, 20 F.2d 837, 838
(7th Cir. 1927).
168. SNELL, supra note 167, at 8-9. 1 SPENCE, EQUITABLE JURISDICTION 414 (1846).
169. SNELL, supra note 167, at 9-10;'G. C_.ARK, EQUITY § 15 (1954). See also Pound, The
Decadence of Equity, 5 COLUM. L. Rnv. 20 (1905).
170. M. BIGELOW, ELEMENTS OF EQUITY FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS 199 (1879).
171. 1 F. LAWRENCE, A TREATISE ON THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
§ 258 (1929).
172. Id.
173. In Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 424, the Supreme Court held that back pay could be denied
because of the tardiness of a plaintiff in requesting back pay if the result is that the defendant is
prejudiced by it. In comparison, the traditional requirements for a defense of laches to back pay
awards is very limited. See, eg., EEOC v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 622 F.2d 271, 275-76 (7th Cir.
1980).
174. See, eg., Alaniz v. California Processors, Inc., 785 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1986); Le Beau v.
Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 727 F.2d 141 (7th Cir. 1984).
175. See 2 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 67, at § 14.6.
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faith of the defendant 76 or the defendant's lack of intent to discrimi-
nate177 do not prevent the plaintiff from receiving back pay. 178
Finally, hinging the nature of back pay upon the discretionary lan-
guage of the statute grants Congress the power to undermine the consti-
tutional right. If the discretion of a court in granting a remedy makes
the remedy equitable, then it would follow that the legislature could un-
dermine the right to jury trial by simply making an otherwise legal rem-
edy discretionary. Such a holding would not comport with the original
intention behind the creation of the seventh amendment 179 and would
lower the status of the jury trial guarantee.
3. Integral Part of an Equitable Remedy
Perhaps the most commonly cited reason for denying a right to a
jury trial under Title VII is that back pay constitutes an "integral part of
an equitable remedy."18 Presumably, the phrase signifies that back pay
loses its legal characteristics when mixed with the heavy balance of equi-
table remedies available under Title VII. Such a rationale is a holdover
of the "clean up doctrine" of equity courts which gave equity jurisdiction
over legal claims, even where those remedies were now available at law.
By using this rationale, courts are ignoring the Supreme Court, which
has explicitly rejected the "clean-up" doctrine in the seventh amendment
analysis.
Before the merger of equity and law, great restraints were applied to
slow the seepage of equity jurisdiction, one of which was the "equitable
176. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 422. See also Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976). The rationale behind the refusal to let the lack of bad
faith enter into the determination lies in the compensatory nature of backpay: "[Black pay is not a
penalty imposed as a sanction for moral turpitude; it is compensation for the tangible economic loss
resulting from an unlawful employment practice. Under Title VII the plaintiff class is entitled to
compensation for that loss, however benevolent the motives for its imposition." Robinson v. Loril-
lard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 804 (4th Cir. 1971).
177. The courts have almost unanimously adopted the rule that the intent required for an "in-
tentional" violation of Title VII is only that the defendant have intended to do the acts that created
the discriminatory effect and not that the defendant have intended the effect itself. 2 LARSON, EM-
PLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 50.60 (1979).
178. Other traditionally equitable considerations that cannot enter into the determination in-
clude: "(1) the unsettled state of the law; (2) reliance on previous judicial opinions; ... [(3)] the
judicial cost of calculating numerous awards; . . . [and (4)] the absence of specifically identified
victims." 2 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 67, § 14.3, at 13. Additionally, the equita-
ble argument that back pay should be denied where the amount owing cannot be established with
certainty has been rejected. Salinas v. Roadway Express, Inc., 735 F.2d 1574, 1578-79 (5th Cir.
1984).
179. See supra notes 94-101 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 11.
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clean-up" doctrine. Equity jurisdiction could generally be invoked if the
remedy at law would be inadequate. 1 ' As the common law courts ex-
panded to cover means of relief formerly unknown at law, the natural
effect was to decrease the jurisdiction of equity.8 2 To maintain equity's
power, the rule developed that where jurisdiction has properly attached
in equity because of the inadequacy of the remedy at law, equity will
retain jurisdiction even though a court of law could grant such a rem-
edy.183 From this rule, courts fashioned a similar principle when deter-
mining whether a right to jury trial existed in actions where both legal
and equitable remedies where sought. After balancing the equitable is-
sues with the legal issues, if it appeared that the legal relief requested was
incidental to the equitable relief, the right to jury trial did not exist.I84
The Supreme Court extended the jury trial guarantee by rejecting
the "equitable clean-up" doctrine in Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover 85
and Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood.'86 Anticipating a suit for treble damages
under an anti-trust action, the plaintiff in Beacon Theaters filed a suit
seeking declaratory relief, forcing the defendant to assert the antitrust
claim as a counterclaim.' 7 The trial court directed that the declaratory
relief action be tried by the judge alone before allowing the jury to deter-
mine the antitrust claims. 88 However, res judicata would probably bar
the antitrust claim from being tried in the second suit because the same
basic transaction formed both claims, and thus a jury trial would not
have been available.18 9 Overturning the trial court, the Supreme Court
held that the "right to a jury trial of legal issues [cannot] be lost through
prior determination of equitable claims.' 190 Two years later in Dairy
Queen, the court expanded Beacon Theaters to include situations where
the legal and equitable remedies were sought in the same claim. The
plaintiff in Dairy Queen brought suit to enforce a contract licensing the
181. J. ADAMS, DOCTRINE OF EQUITY 9 (5th ed. 1868). The principle is illustrated by several
well-known maxims of equity, such as "equity follows the law." J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 64 (11th ed. 1873).
182. J. STORY, supra note 181, § 64i.
183. Id See D. DOBBS, supra note 129, § 2.7, at 83-85. See also G. BISPHAM, THE PRINCIPLES
OF EQUITY 18 (5th ed. 1882).
184. See Home Ins. Co. of New York v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co., 109 F. 681, 691
(C.C.D.S.C. 1901).
185. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
186. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
187. 359 U.S. at 503.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 504.
190. Id. at 511.
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RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
trademark "Dairy Queen."' 91 The plaintiff requested several types of eq-
uitable relief, including an accounting of the money owed under the con-
tract.192 Reading the request for an accounting as a request for legal
damages, the court explicitly held that a right to jury trial existed regard-
less of "whether the trial judge chooses to characterize the legal issues
presented as 'incidental' to equitable issues or not."'19 Thus, the fact
that Title VII back pay is intermixed with a variety of equitable remedies
does not take away the right to jury trial.
V. CONCLUSION
Other than an unusually strict adherence to the doctrine of stare
decisis, there seems to be no reason for denying a right to jury trial under
Title VII. The unconvincing statutory and legislative intent does not
overwhelm the constitutional issues given the original intent of the pro-
ponents of the seventh amendment to protect the jury trial from the arbi-
trary whims of Congress. Even if deference is given to the implicit will of
Congress in the Title VII context, the proffered policies behind the denial
of the jury procedure no longer exist. Further, under a modem seventh
amendment analysis, analogies can be made between Title VII actions
and a variety of 18th century contractual and tort actions, all of which
provided a right to jury trial. Likewise, as a substitute for specific per-
formance, back pay is legal rather than equitable. Finally, other reasons
for classifying Title VII back pay as equitable, by pointing to its discre-
tionary nature or to the outdated equitable clean-up doctrine, likewise
fail. Thus, a right to jury trial exists under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.
Kerry R. Lewis
191. 369 U.S. at 473.
192. The court later construed the prayer for the traditionally equitable accounting as a claim
for money damages. Id. at 475.
193. Id. at 473. The court also noted with approval a quote from Thermo-Stitch, Inc. v. Chemi-
Cord Processing, 294 F.2d 486, 491 (5th Cir. 1961):
It is therefore immaterial that the case at bar contains a stronger basis for equitable relief
than was present in Beacon Theaters. It would make no difference if the equitable cause
clearly outweighed the legal cause so that the basic issue of the case taken as a whole is
equitable. As long as any legal cause is involved the jury rights it creates control. This is
the teaching of Beacon Theaters, as we construe it.
369 U.S. at 473 n.8.
1991]
29
Lewis: A Reexamination of the Constitutional Right to a Jury Trial under
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1990
30
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 26 [1990], Iss. 4, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol26/iss4/5
